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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action for a Writ of Mandamus to be is-
sued out of this court in the exercise of its original juris-
diction. The general authority for such a writ is Rule 65B 
(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the specific auth-
ority for this particular type of action is set forth in Sec-
tion 20-11-16, Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
The petition for the writ, including all of the at-
tached exhibits filed in this court generally set forth the 
facts involved in this case. Some facts as are seriously 
in issue have been settled by the stipulation of the par-
ties which is on file herein. 
On February 19, 1953 the City Council of Cedar City, 
Utah duly passed an ordinance granting to Southern 
Utah Power Company a twenty year electric franchise 
within Cedar City, Utah. This ordinance which is set forth 
as Petitioners' Exhibit "A" was published February 26 
and by its terms would become effective March 21, 1953. 
On March 7, 1953 nine reside·nts of Cedar City, Utah who 
acted as "sponsors" filed an application for petition 
copies with the City Recorder in order to have petitions 
printed so that the ordina·nce could be referred to the 
people for their approval or rejection at the next city 
election. Five copies of the proposed Petition for Refer-
endum were filed with the application and the applica-
tion was duly verified as provided by law. Upon the filing, 
the City Recorder gave a receipt therefor and also signed 
a certificate that the petition following was a true and 
correct copy. The sponsors then had the petitions and 
circulation sheets printed up themselves at the Iron 
County Record, a publishing and printing company of 
Cedar City, Utah. There were printed up fifteen sections 
of the petition, with each section having a cover sheet of 
the Referendum Petition, together with the printed certi· 
ficate of the City Recorder, and also six circulation sheets 
attached: On March 10, 1953 after the petitions had been 
printed by the sponsors, all fifteen sections \vere taken 
to the City Recorder for her inspection and for her to 
sign her name in ink over her printed signature and to 
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attach the corporate seal of Cedar City Corporation. 
This she declined to do and on March 12 notified the 
sponsors that the fifteen sections of the petition could 
be obtained at her office but that that they would not be 
signed and sealed by her. They were later received back 
by the sponsors, unsigned but since the City Recorder 
had notified the sponsors that she would not sign them, 
the sponsors, who had had printed originally sufficient 
petitions and circulation sheets for fifteen additional 
identical sections, commenced the circulation of the pe-
tition in Cedar City, Utah, and 449 signatures were ob-
tained. 
The fifteen sections \Vere then taken to the County 
Clerk of Iron County, Utah on March 20, 1953 for check-
ing against his official registration list of registered and 
qualified voters in Cedar City, Utah. He duly certified 
that in 1952 at the general election, 3122 persons of all 
parties voted for all candidates for Governor in Cedar 
City, Utah and that the Referendum Petition presented 
to him for checking had the names of 430 duly registered 
and qualified voters of Cedar City, Utah. The Clerk also 
certified as shown in Exhibit "E" that 430 qualified and 
registered voters appeared on the petition and that he 
had placed a check mark before each name of a quali-
fied and registered voter. Actually the check marks were 
placed after the name and there were 430 such checked 
names. The County Clerk subsequently on March 27, 1953 
certified as shown in Exhibit "E-1" that actually he had 
placed the check mark (V) after the name and that 
those not so checked with the check mark ( V) did not 
appear to be duly registered. There were 19 of these 
names. 
On March 20, 1953 during the afternoo·n of said day, 
which was a day before the franchise ordinance would 
have become effective, all fifteen sections of the Referen-
dum Petition, together with the County Clerk's certifi-
cates, were delivered to the City Recorder's office_ in 
the County Clerk's sealed envelope. On March 24, 1953 
the sponsors were notified that the City Recorder had 
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found the petition insufficient for the reason that it car-
ried NO names of registered voters. According to Section 
20-11-22, Utah Code Ann. 1953, the required number of 
signers of a referendum petition in Cedar City, Utah 
based upon the vote in 1952 for Governor would be 390 
names. The County Clerk has certified that there \Yere 
430 names of registered and qualified voters on the 
petition. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Referendum Petition, although printed and paid 
for by the sponsors themselves is entirely legal and 
proper and would have to be accepted by the City Re-
corder provided it carried the required number of 
qualified signers. 
2. That the Refere·ndum Petition circulated was duly 
certified to and the fact that each section of the pe-
tition was not signed in the hand-writing of the City 
Recorder cannot be relied upon by the defendants 
as any defense. 
3. Any deficiencies in the County Clerk's Certificate as 
to how the names of the :registered voters were 
checked is immaterial, particularly in view of the 
fact the clerical error was corrected and in any 
event, the sponsors were not notified of any defi-
ciency until it was too late to correct it. 
ARGUMENT 
The procedure for direct legislation, or Initiative and 
Referendum, is set out in Title 20, Chapter 11, Utah Code 
Ann. 1953. The right of direct legislation is probably 
one of the most fundamental rights of the people under 
democratic government. In fact this right is preserved 
by our State Constitution at Article VI, Section 1. Di· 
rect legislatio·n by Initiative and Referendum by the peo-
ple is actually encouraged in our govern1nental and 
judicial system because in the last analysis, all govern· 
mental power still resides in the people. Although Chap· 
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ter 11 of Title 20 sets out the procedure, it is clear from 
reading the chapter and also from several decisions 
handed down by this court, that many of the require-
ments are matters of form only and are directory and 
are not to interfere with the rights of the people to vote 
in direct legislation elections. The general rule of law is 
that these statutes should be liberally construed so as to 
preserve this valuable right and this court in the case of 
Halgren vs. Welling, 63 Pac. 2nd. 550 and Allen vs. Ras-
mussen, 117 Pac. 2nd. 287 has adhered to this ge·neral 
rule. The reasons are aptly given in the Halgren case; to 
quote. 
"The right of direct legislation is in the people. It 
is the duty of officers charged with administration 
matters relating to the Initiative and Referendum 
Law to make it effective and operative if possible. 
Technical and restrictive constructions placed upo·n 
such laws \vould tend to defeat the purpose and pol-
icies governing the submission of such measures to 
the people for adoption. With the best safeguards 
that can be thrown around the preparation, circula-
tion, assembling, and submitting of petitions relati'ng 
to the Initiative or Referendum Law, inaccuracies, 
and at times technical departures from prescribed 
forms, are likely to occur. The rigid application of 
technical constructions relating to the law, if made 
by officers charged with the administration thereof, 
may effectively defeat the purposes of the law. Offi-
cers should interpret the law, if possible, so as to 
sustain it and make its purposes effective, and bring 
about the purposes intended by the legislature. As 
heretofore indicated, the forms prescribed are not 
mandatory, and if they are substantially followed 
the petition should be held to be sufficient notwith-
standing merely technical errors as to form." 
There is one unfortunate feature in Chapter 11 of 
Title 20 in that the entire act is drawn primarily for 
Initiative measures, as distinguished from merely local 
Referendums of City Ordinances. Since a statewide Initi-
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ative is a considerable undertaking on the part of a group 
of citizens who usually have no personal motive or noth-
ing to gain by the action and would be at considerable ex-
pense, in fact so much that in many instances the cost 
would discourage the use of the direct legislative ma-
chinery, the statute has attempted to make the proced-
ure within the financial reach of all. Section 20-11-13 
provides that whe·n an application for Petition copies is 
filed, the Secretary of State shall within ten days solicit 
"bids from not less than three competent printers for 
the printing of the petitions." The Secretary of State 
shall notify the sponsors within the ten days of the low-
est and best bid and request the cost to be paid to hin1 
by the spoi1sors. The printing is to be in six point type 
which is admittedly quite small, but this surely is only to 
keep the cost of printing down. Within ten days after the 
cost of printing is received from the sponsors, the Secre-
tary· of State is to have the petitions and circulation 
sheets printed and bound and ready for delivery to the 
sponsors. The provisions of this particular section are 
obviously only directory and for the protection of the 
sponsors themselves. In a statewide initiative procedure, 
where a lengthy law is proposed, it is conceivable that 
the cost of printing the sufficient petitions could run into 
hundreds of dollars and this statute is obviously enacted 
to keep the cost to a minimum. Chapter 20, Section 21 
provides that cities and towns may adopt the statewide 
procedure and in such cases, the City Recorder performs 
the functions of the Secretary of State. 
In this particular case, instead of having a statewide 
initiative measure, we have only .a local city referendum. 
The printing cost is a minor item and since the statute in 
question is only for the protection of the sponsors them-
selves, they could waive it if they so chose. It is elemen· 
tary that any person or group can waive a contract provi-
sion or statute which is entirely for their own protection 
if other rights are not involved. On this point 56 Am. Jur. 
Page 109 provides: 
"Statutory rights may be \Vaived or surrendered 
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in \Yhole or in part by the party to whom or for 
\vhose benefit they are given, if he does not thereby 
destroy the rights, and benefits flowing to an-
other ... " 
Since the sponsors have to pay the cost of printing in 
any event, regardless of what the cost may be, and no 
part comes from public funds, it would make no differ-
ence if the city or the sponsors printed up the petitions. 
It is submitted that the statutory procedure is only set 
out as a guide to get the work done and to make it as 
cheap for the sponsors as possible. Surely the City Re-
corder or city officials would have no_ cause to complain 
if the sponsors handled this themselves, so long as it was 
done according to law. 
To further show that the failure of the city to have 
these petitions printed is a matter of minor importance is 
the fact that the City Recorder in fact did solicit bids for 
the printing and received only one bid, one from the 
printing firm which had previously printed them. lt is 
of interest to note that the City Recorder sent out the 
request for bids on the same day the printed petitions 
were presented to her for signature. The petitioners con-
tend that this is truly being a slave to the statute. It is 
of further interest to note that the bid actually received 
from the one printer was in the small suin of $8.65 and it 
is submitted that the payment of this small sum by the 
nine sponsors would not and did not strain their finances. 
If the City had been prejudiced in any way by the print-
ing of this petition by the sponsors themselves and pay-
i'ng for its cost, then the situation might be different. 
Since the City could in no way be prejudiced by the 
fact that the sponsors immediately went ahead with the 
printing upon filing the application with the City Re-
corder, waiting for a possible twenty days for the printed 
petitions to be delivered to them by the City Recorder 
would be needless and foolish to say the least. Under the 
statute, the City Recorder could have takeri a minimum 
of twenty days to get this all done and since the peti-
tions as actually printed conform to the law in every way, 
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except possibly the fact that they were printed in 5~~ 
point type instead of 6 point type, '''hich objection is en-
tirely groundless, no one has any right now to complain. 
At this point attention should be called to one glar-
ing deficiency in the direct legislation statute, \vhich is 
the shortness of time for a referendum petition to be 
filed, particularly on a city ordinance. Initiative creates 
no problem as it can be done at any time but a city refer-
endum petition must be filed before the ordinance be-
comes effective which is by law twenty days after publi-
cation or thirty days after passage, which ever of said 
days is the most remote from final passage. In this in-
stance there was only the thirty days from passage 
which would be March 21, 1953. If the sponsors must file 
their application for petitions and wait for a possible 
twenty days before they can start circulating their peti-
tion, in many cases there would be no referendum at all 
because an unfriendly City Recorder can take the full 
time allowed by law and there would be little if any time 
to circulate, check and file the petition. It must be ad-
mitted that occasions when opponents of a city measure 
can file an application for a petition, immediately after 
the passage of the act ~re rare. A committee must first 
organize and this normally would take several days. 
Furthermore, the City Recorder could if she so desired, 
wait for ten days or longer before he delivered the adopt-
ed ordinance to a publisher for publishing, in which event 
there would be only twenty days in which opponents 
could organize, file an application for petition copies and 
have them printed, circulated and checked and filed and 
as noted, under the procedure the city recorder can legal· 
ly take at least twenty days to get this done if she so 
desires, leaving n9 time to obtain any signatures. 
It is true as pointed out in the case of Allen Ys. Ras~ 
mussen, supra, when this shortness of time in a city ref· 
erendum was considered by this court, the court l't'-
marked that it could not be said that the sponsors could 
not have sufficient time, but the point which the }Jetition· 
ers wish to make is this-in vie-.v of the general rule of 
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law that these statutes should be liberally construed, is it 
more important to follow the statute strictly even on 
immaterial and directory rna tters than it is to afford the 
citizenry of the right to vote on 1neasures? It most cer-
tainly would be wrong to have an unco-operative City 
Recorder or City Administration foil an attempt to ques-
tion a city measure by merely taking the time allowed 
by law, but this could be done in many instances. 
It is admittedly disturbing to the writer that cases 
cannot be found in the reports in which sponsors of a 
referendum petition did not want to wait on the public 
official to have the printing done, but did it and paid for 
it themselves. It appears to the writer that the question 
is so obvious that no case has been tried and appealed 
where this situation was involved. There is one Arizona 
case, however, that of Kerby vs. Griffin 62 Pac. 2nd 1131 
where a related problem arose. In that case an initiative 
petition had been filed with the Secretary of State. Un-
der the Arizona law, as in ours, the Secretary of State 
had the duty of printing up and mailing out publicity 
pamphlets for and against the measure and this had to 
done within a certain time before election. In this case, 
the defendant Secretary of State maintained that the 
reason he had not complied with the law was because 
as the law was written, there was not sufficient time to 
comply, particularly whe·n he would have to solicit bids 
for the printing of the pamphlet and then get it printed 
and mailed. Soliciting of bids for the printing was not di-
rectly required in the Arizona Initiative and Referendum 
law. The Arizona court said that although the practice 
of soliciting bids on state printing was commendable and 
under all ordinary circumstances should be done, still, 
where it interfered with the getting of the direct legis-
lation question before the people, it should be by all 
means dispensed with. And in this instance, public funds 
were being used for the printing of this pamphlet and 
not private funds from the sponsors themselves, as in 
the present case. 
There are cases in which certain requirements of 
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the statute have not been complied with but the writer 
has found none on the specific question here involved. 
In the case of Halgren vs. Welling, Supra, there \vere 
many irregularities pointed out and the court said they 
were merely matters of form and were disregarded. 
Therefore, it would seem that the fact that the spon-
sors handled and paid for their own printing is immater-
ial i'n this case for two reasons, (1) that the statute is for 
the protection of the sponsors themselves and they could 
waive if they so desired and (2) this is only a directory 
requirement and not mandatory and to hold that it is 
mandatory would require a useless act and would prohi-
bit, in many cases the use of our direct legislation statute. 
The second point raised by the answer of the defend-
ants is the fact that the petition circulated did not have 
a certified copy of the referendum petition attached 
thereto. Section 20-11-12 and 20-11-13 Utah Code Ann. 
1953 provide that the petition for circulation can be di-
vided i'nto sections but that each section of circulations 
sheets must have attached a certified copy of the refer-
endum petition. This is only as it should be because it 
would be wrong for circulators of the petition to merely 
take · around circulation sheets asking people to sign 
without the signers knowing what they were signing. It 
is common knowledge that people \Viii sign any kind of 
petition or anything .requested of them and the statute 
requires that a copy of the petition must be attached to 
each section. Defendants appear to be raising the ques-
tion that the copies were not properly certified and by 
this it is presumed that they mean that each certificate 
attached to the petition was not signed in ink over the 
printed signature of the City Recorder and because such 
was not the case, the petitions \vere not certified. Each 
bore the printed name of the Recorder and she had pre-
viously signed a certificate that the petition was a true 
and correct copy of the petition filed with her and thi~ 
certificate is before the Court as Petitio·ner's Exhibit 
"H". The petitioners maintain, that this signing was not 
necessary in order to have a certified copy of the petition 
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with each section circulated. The Recorder had in fact 
signed such a certificate and the petition copies were as 
they are designated, "petition copies". Furthermore, no 
claim is made that the form or substance of the petition 
would in any way mislead any signer and if a signer was 
willing to sign the petition as presented to him and which 
is before the court, no one would have any cause to com-
plain. 
It should also be noted that there is no allegation of 
fraud or wrongdoing on the part of the sponsors in cir-
culating the petition. The ordinance asked to be referred 
is correctly described on the face of the petition and 
there is no claim that signers did not have full knowledge 
of what they were requesting the City Officials to do. It 
is submitted that the very form of the petition circulated 
speaks for itself as to its full validity. · 
Defendants appear to be making capital of the fact 
that the petitions signed were not the ones presented to 
the City Recorder for her signing, sealing and inspection. 
Actually they were not but were identical copies as they 
were all printed up at the same time and this could not 
possibly make any difference. Furthermore, there is no 
claim on the part of the defendants there was any dif-
ference or that the sponsors wrongfully substituted sonle-
thing else. At any rate, the sections originally delivered 
to the Recorder for signing and sealing were actually 
returned unsealed and unsigned so that they were iden-
tical in every way with the ones circulated. 
But it ill-behooves the defendants to now assert that 
the petitions were not signed by the Recorder, or number-
ed or authorized by her. After the petitions and circula-
tion sheets had been printed by the sponsors according 
to the statutes they were in fact presented to the Record-
er for her inspection and for the express purpose of ha v-
ing her sign them in ink and to affix the corporate seal. 
This she declined to do and returned the petitions un-
signed. The defendants certainly cannot now be heard 
to complain that other identical copies were circulated 
or that they were not signed in ink. 
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The third point to be made by the petitioners raised 
by the defendants is the fact that the certificate of the 
County Clerk of Iron County as to the number of regis-
tered voters is erroneous. This appears to have even less 
weight, if possible, than the other points raised. Let us 
look at the facts. Section 20-11-16, Utah Code, Ann. 1953 
requires that the names on the petitions be checked by 
the County Clerk in order to determine if the signers are 
registered voters. The case of Allen vs. Rasmussen, supra, 
held that the sponsors had the obligation of getting this 
done themselves before filing the petition with the City 
Recorder. This was complied with. The case of Halgren 
vs. Welling, supra also held thai: the word "check" as 
used in the statute means that the County Clerk shall 
compare the names on the referendum petition with the 
names on his registration lists to determine if the signers 
are duly registered. This was all done in the County 
Clerk's office March 20, 1953. Plaintiffs submit that as to 
where on the petition the Clerk designated the registered 
voters or whether he made such designation is entirely 
immaterial. So long as he certified that there were names 
of 430 registered voters is the important thing. Merely 
placing a check either after or before the name of each 
person as appeared to be registered was merely for the 
convenience of the City Recorder whe·n she checked over 
the signatures. But the City Recorder has chosen tore-
fuse the petition in toto. To now hold that merely because 
the Clerk said he placed a check mark in front of each 
name of those who appeared to be registered whereas the 
check mark appears after the na1ne invalidates the pe-
tition, would be fantastic to say the least. The petitions 
are before the court and it should be perfectly obvious 
from them that the names of the persons duly registered 
were marked and that there should be no room for doubt 
in the matter. To now say that because they \vere not 
checked where the County Clerk said they were, would 
be allowing an innocent mistake on the part of a public 
officer to vitiate the entire proceeding to the detrin1ent 
of all of the hundreds of people \vho wanted to vote on 
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the measure. It would be a mo·nstrosity indeed to deprive 
the public of this right merely bec:tuse of a simple clerical 
error on the part of the public official. But at any rate, 
when this was discovered by the County Clerk upon noti-
fication by the City Recorder on March 24th, the County 
Clerk submitted another certificate, marked Exhibit 
"E-1" clarifying his action if such were in fact needed. 
A California case, vVillett vs. J orda·n, 35 Pac. 2nd 1025 is 
particularly apt on this point. There the County Clerk 
certified to the Secretary of State that on the petition 
filed in his office there were the names of so many duly 
registered voters but the amount certified to was incor-
rect as actually there were several thousand more names," 
and four days later, but after the filing deadline, the 
County Clerk discovered his error and made a new certi-
ficate of the correct number. The new certificate was 
made three days after the filing deadline. It so happened 
that the mistake was very material because the differ-
ence in the count made the difference of whether there 
were sufficient names or not. The court said that the last 
certificate related back to the first so that it would be on 
time. The court said further. 
"To refuse its application under the facts disclosed 
would countenance a palpable injustice to those who, 
at great expense and effort, did all that was required 
of them by law, and had established the antecedent 
right to have their petition recognized as sufficient. 
The correction of the admitted mistake of the public 
officer, the County Clerk, and the amendment of the 
original certificate by him must therefore be deem-
ed to date back to the time of the filing of the certi-
ficate originally filed." 
~dded to this is the fact that the City Recorder, as held 
In the case of Allen vs. Rasmussen, supra, owes the duty 
to. notify the sponsors before the filing deadline of any 
deficiency in signatures, but waited for four days to do so 
the City Recorder cannot now be heard to say that th~ 
certificate of the County Clerk was insufficient. 
The plaintiffs maintain that the defendants cannot rely 
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now upon any deficiency they claim existed in the County 
Clerk's certificate for two main reasons, first, because 
the Defendants had an opportunity to recount the signa-
tures after the new or supplemental certificate of the 
County· Clerk was filed with the City Recorder but still 
failed to change their count, and second, because the City 
Recorder had the opportunity to notify the sponsors of 
any deficiency in the County Clerk's Certificate but failed 
to do so until four days after the filing of the petition 
and three days after the filing deadline. Petitioner's ex-
hibit "F" which is the certificate of the City Recorder in 
which the referendum petition was designated as insuf-
ficient for the reason that it co·ntained NO names of 
registered voters, was delivered to the sponsors on March 
24th or three days after the filing deadline. The Allen vs 
Ra.sriiu-ssen case held that the City Recorder owed a duty 
to· notify the ·sponsors in sufficient time, if any there was, 
for- them to correct any insufficiency. In fact Section 20-
11-16 so states. If there was any doubt in the mind of the 
City Recorder as to the County Clerk's certificate, she 
had the duty to notify the sponsors and they would then 
have had an opportunity to correct or rectify any de-
ficiency. When they were not notified until three days 
after the filing deadline they had no opportunity to get 
a corrected certificate from the County Clerk and file it 
prior to the expiration of March 21st. It would have been 
a simple rna tter to rectify this had the sponsors been so 
advised. · 
CONCLUSIONS 
Therefore, plaintiffs argue that their prayer for a ~'rit 
of Mandamus, compelling the defendants and in par· 
t~c;ular the City Recorder to accept the referendum peti-
ti~n should be granted for the following reasons: 
1. The Referendum petition, although completely print· 
ed and paid for directly by the sponsors rather than 
~.~!t!:gg_f~r th.e City Recorder to do so, was entirely legal 
as. to form and substance. That the only statute not fol-
lowed to the letter is the one pertaining to the manner of 
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soliciting bids on the printing and this is entirely for the 
benefit and protection of the sponsors themselves and it 
could therefore be waived. To hold otherwise would mean 
that sponsors have to comply with a useless restriction 
which \vould make the submission of referendums to the 
people very difficult and this right should not be allowed 
to be abrogated by unfriendly city officials. 
2. The petitions circulated were properly certified 
copies of the petition filed with the City Recorder and 
the defendants cannot now be heard to say they are ·not 
when they failed to comply with the sponsors' request to 
sign and seal them. Furthermore, there as no claim that 
any signer was mislead iri any way by the petition cir-
culated, or that there was any fraud. 
3. The mere clerical errors of the County Clerk in his 
certificate as to the checking of the names is immaterial 
as the petition itself is clear on its face who are the regis-
tered voters and the certificate of the Clerk as to the 
number is the important thing anyway. No o·ne in Iron 
County was better qualified to know who were registered 
voters and he has certified that there are sufficient 
names on the petition. If there is any deficiency in his 
certificates, the City had the duty to notify the spo·nsors 
so that they could rectify any mistake, if any there be, 
which the defendants failed to do. 
Petitioners contend that the defendants have not in 
fact shown any valid cause for not accepting as sufficient 
the referendum petition proffered to them and that their 
refusal to accept it is capricious and arbitrary to say the 
least, and that a peremptory writ should issue. 
In support of the plaintiffs' prayer and motion for an 
attorney fee for their counsel in this matter in the event 
the Court sees fit to issue a Writ ot Mandamus, the plain-
tiffs call attention to the affidavit of the sponsors a·nd 
also their counsel. The court has before it ample evidence 
of the reasonableness of an attorney fee. If the Court 
grants this writ, it will only be because the action of the 
defe·ndants and particularly that of the City Recorder was 
arbitrary and capricious and the failure to perform a 
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public duty enjoined by law. The plaintiffs as sponsors 
have been forced to compel the defendants to do \\'hat 
the law requires them to do. In this they have suffered 
damage, particularly in the incurring or paying of an 
attorney fee. The sponsors and plaintiffs have no pecun-
iary interest in this proceeding and are only pursuing 
this remedy as citizens and voters in Cedar City, Utah. 
The proof shows that the sponsors have agreed to pay a 
reasonable attorney fee as set by their counsel and their 
counsel has shown the services rendered and their reason-
able value. It is true that the granting or refusing an at-
torney fee is discretionery with the court but it would 
appear that the action of the defendants as the duly elect-
ed officials of Cedar City, Utah is so arbitrary and capri-
cious that there is little room to doubt their motives in 
this matter. The court has statutory authority to grant 
an attorney fee by Section 78-35-9, Utah Code Ann. 1953 
which provides. 
"If judgment is given for applicant, he may recover 
damages·which he has sustained as found by the jury 
or as may be determined by the court or referees 
upon a reference ordered, together with costs and 
for such damage and costs an execution may issue 
and a peremptory mandate must be awarded with-
out delay." 
This court, i'n the case of the Colorado Development Co. 
vs. Creer, 80 Pac. 2nd 914 has held that in mandamus pro-
ceedings, damages properly include attorney fees, where 
properly shown. Therefore, the court has authority for 
the award of such a fee and it is submitted that the 




Cedar City, Utah. 
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